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ABSTRACT
There is a long historic record of use of biological warfare (BW) agents by warring countries
against their enemies. However, the frequency of their use has increased since the beginning
of the twentieth century. World war I witnessed the use of anthrax agent against human beings
and animals by Germans, followed by large-scale field trials by Japanese against war prisoners
and Chinese population during world war II. Ironically, research and development in biological
warfare agents increased tremendously after the Geneva Protocol, signed in 1925, because of
its drawbacks which were overcome by Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in
1972. Biological warfare programme took back seat after the 1972 convention but biological
agents regained their importance after the bioterrorist attacks of anthrax powder in 2001. In the
light of these attacks, many of which turned out to be hoax, general awareness is required about
biological warfare agents that can be used against them. This review has been written highlighting
important biological warfare agents, diseases caused by them, possible therapies and other
protection measures.
 Keywords: Biological warfare agents, biological warfare, weapons of mass destruction, BTWC,
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, biodefence, bacterial agents, viral agents,
toxins
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1 . INTRODUCTION
Biological warfare agents have received greater
attention after the episode of terrorist attack on
World Trade Centre in USA on September 11,
2001 followed by the use of anthrax spores as
means of bioterrorism. One must acknowledge that
no moral, technical or legal barriers can protect
the world from the use of deadly biological agents.
So this is becoming an emerging threat, not only
from the public health point of view but also for
the stability of a country, as it will have serious
effects on the economy.
The history of use of biological warfare (BW)
agents dates back to 14th century when Tartar
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forces used the plague-infected bodies of their
own soldiers to create disease and havoc in the
walled city of Kaffa (now in Ukraine) which ultimately
led to the downfall of Kaffa1. In another incidence
in the 18th century, British forces distributed smallpox-
infected handkerchiefs and blankets to the native
American tribes which were opposing the British
rule in America2. Subsequently in world war I,
Germans used Bacillus anthracis and Burkholderia
mallei against livestocks transported from Romania
to USSR. Although use of BW agents was very
less in world war I but chemical weapons were
used extensively, which lead to the formulation of
Geneva Protocol in 1925. This Protocol states,
"Prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating,
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poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological
methods of warfare". Although the Geneva Protocol
prohibited the use of biological weapons, it did not
prohibit research and development, production and/
or storage of biological weapons1. As a result, later
in world war II, Japanese conducted extensive
field trials of Bacillus anthracis, Neisseria meningitidis,
Shigella, Vibrio cholerae and Yersinia pestis against
prisoners of war. They also used these agents
against Chinese, inflicting more than 10,000 casualties,
including death of around 1700 Japanese soldiers
itself 1. After this, the world community realised
the importance of biological warfare agents as
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and several
countries started research and production of biological
warfare agents. Ultimately in 1969, the then US
President insisted on disarmament of biological weapons
which resulted in 1972's Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC). This is called 'Convention on
the Prohibition of Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons
and their Destruction'. At this time, most of the
western countries stopped public funding for biological
warfare research and development except a few.
The anthrax outbreak of 1979 in Sverdlosk (USSR)
resulted in 66 deaths, affecting the human population
up to 4 km downwind. Later, the then Russian
President in 1992 admitted the outbreak by accidental
release of anthrax spores from one of its offensive
biological warfare production facilities3.
In 1975, US ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol
and BTWC of 1972. Since then, the Convention
has been ratified by more than 140 countries to
which India is also a signatory. But this Convention
still has certain flaws and the main flaw is that it
does not contain provisions for monitoring and inspection
of biological warfare agents, and enforcement of
the treaty 4.
The term NBC refers to nuclear, biological
and chemical weapons. Nowadays, people are mainly
concerned with B and C, ie, biological and chemical
weapons because unlike nuclear, these can be used
covertly by the rogue countries and terrorist organisations.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is in force
for prohibiting the use of chemical weapons but
there is no such legally binding treaty for biological
weapons. The major difference between the two
types of agents is that chemical weapons are nonliving
poisons made artificially while biological agents
are living, natural and reproduce inside the host to
cause incapacitating or fatal diseases5
. So a very
small quantity of a biological agent may be sufficient
to cause morbidity and mortality. Some biological
agents are highly infectious, eg, plague and smallpox,
which can be spread to large population within few
days, causing epidemics and sometime pandemics
also. However, toxins like botulinum and others
share features common to chemical warfare agents
as well 6. There are many other characteristics of
biological warfare agents which make them attractive
choice as weapons of mass destruction. Specialised
equipment and huge infrastructure is not required
for the production of biological warfare agents. A
small microbiological laboratory can produce them
because both literature and equipment are available
in public domain without any distinction for use in
offensive or defensive purposes. Since a very small
laboratory is sufficient for biological warfare agents'
production, so it is very easy to hide the production
facility as well. Further, a small amount of pure
culture is required to initiate production which was
quite easy to obtain commercially until recently.
Since biological warfare agents produce delayed
symptoms, and unlike chemical warfare agents are
odourless and colourless, so it is difficult to pinpoint
the origin of attack. These biological warfare agents
are very specific and damage is done only where
it is intended. So, all these features alongwith difficulty
in detection make biological warfare agents as
weapons of choice for mass destruction.
2 . BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS
Biological warfare agents are microorganisms
(or toxins produced from them) which cause diseases
in man, animal or plant, or which can cause the
deterioration of material, eg, petroleum-eating bacteria.
Use of such biological agents to cause lethal or
incapacitating effects on target population or plants
is called biological warfare. These biological warfare
agents are broadly classified into four groups, viz.,
bacteria, viruses, fungi, and toxins.
• Bacteria: Bacteria are prokaryotic microorganisms,
usually single-celled and most of which have
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a characteristic type of cell wall while a few
are wallless, eg, Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia
pestis, etc.
• Viruses: Viruses are noncellular submicroscopic
obligate pathogens which consist of proteins
and nucleic acids (DNA or RNA), eg, Variola
(small pox) virus. These can replicate only in
specific host cells by utilising the host cell
machinery. These host cells may be of animal,
microbial or plant origin.
• Fungi: Fungi are unicellular, multicellular or
coenocytic, heterotrophic eukaryotic microorganisms
which do not contain chlorophyll and which
characteristically form a rigid cell wall containing
chitin and/or cellulose, eg, Coccidioides immitis.
• Toxins: Toxins are secondary metabolites usually
of microbial origin which, when present in low
concentrations in cells or tissues of a higher
multicellular organism, can cause injury by
interfering with the structural and functional
integrity of these cells or tissues. Toxins can
be produced by various bacteria7 (bacterial
toxins, eg, botulinum toxins), algae8 (phycotoxins,
eg, saxitoxin), fungi9 (mycotoxins, eg, trichothecene)
and plants10 (phytotoxins, eg, ricin).
The infective dose of these biological warfare agents
vary considerably from one agent to another (Table 1).
Some of the important BW agents are listed in Table 2 and
described briefly in the following text.
2.1 Bacterial Agents
2.1.1 Bacillus anthracis
Bacillus anthracis is Gram-positive, facultative
anaerobe, non-motile, encapsulated, spore former,
and its cells are arranged in chains (Fig. 1(a)).
Extreme resistance of spores to environmental stress
makes it the most sought after biological warfare
agent. Sporulated cells can survive for years in
water and soil. Live fire tests of anthrax bombs
by the US and Allies in 1943 were conducted at
Gruinard island which led to the long-term contamination
of the Island. The decontamination could only be
done after more than 40 years using formaldehyde
as disinfectant11. Anthrax, a disease primarily of
animals, caused by Bacillus anthracis, is of three
types: (i) Cutaneous anthrax occurs when spores
come in contact with skin due to handling of infected
animals; (ii) gastrointestinal anthrax is caused by
ingestion of food and meat contaminated with spores;
and (iii) respiratory anthrax is caused by the inhalation
of spores present in the environment.
Among these types of anthrax, respiratory anthrax
is the most severe with the mortality rate of more
than 80 per cent, if untreated. According to an
estimate made by World Health Organization (WHO),
Agent Infective dose (per man) Mortality rate (%) 
Bacillus anthracis 8000-50000 spores 5-80 
Yersinia pestis 100-500 organisms 50-100 
Burkholderia mallei Low 50-100  
Brucella species 10-100 organisms 5  
Francisella tularensis 10-50 organisms 40-60 
Variola virus 10-100 plaque forming units (PFU) 10-30 
Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) virus 10-100 PFU 1 
Ebola virus Low 65-80 
Marburg virus Low 35 
Botulinum neurotoxin 70-100 ng -* 
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB) 2-6 µg Rare 
Tricothecene (T2) toxin 60-84 mg -* 
Ricin toxin 150-210 µg -* 
 
Table 1. Infective dose (aerosol) of important biological warfare agents
* Statistical data not available
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Agent Disease Effect Vaccine
 
available 
Potential for 
epidemic spread
Therapeutics 
Bacteria
     
Bacillus anthracis Anthrax Lethal Yes Negligible Penicillin, Ciprofloxacin 
Yersinia pestis Plague Lethal Yes High Tetracycline, Chloramphenicol 
Burkholderia mallei Glanders Lethal No Negligible Sulphadiazine, Chloramphenicol 
Brucella species Brucellosis Incapacitant Yes Negligible Streptomycin, Tetracycline 
Francisella tularensis Tularemia Lethal and 
incapacitant 
Yes Negligible Streptomycin, Chloramphenicol, 
Tetracyclin 
Viruses
Variolla virus Smallpox Lethal No Very high Cidofovir (proven for in-vitro 
effectiveness) 
Venezuelan equine 
encephalitis (VEE) 
virus 
Venezuelan equine 
encephalomyelitis 
Lethal and 
incapacitant 
Yes Possible No specific therapy available 
Ebola virus Hemorrhagic fever Lethal No Possible No specific therapy available 
Marburg virus Hemorrhagic fever Lethal No Possible No specific therapy available 
Fungi
Coccidioides immitis Coccidioidomycosis Lethal and 
incapacitant 
No Rare Amphothericin B,  
Fluconazole 
Toxins
Botulinum neurotoxin Botulism Lethal Yes No Antitoxins 
Staphylococcal   
enterotoxin type B 
(SEB) 
Food poisoning Incapacitant No No No 
Trichothecene (T2) toxin Alimentary toxic 
aleukia (ATA) and 
blisters on skin 
Lethal and 
incapacitant 
No No Phenobarbital, Clofibrate found 
beneficial in animal models 
Ricin toxin Ricin toxicity Lethal No No No 
Table 2. Important biological warfare agents
if 50 kg anthrax spores are released from an aircraft,
a total of 5,00,000 people will be affected, out of
which there will be 1,00,000 deaths12.
Though the description of detection methods
for individual biological warfare agents is beyond
the scope of this article but detection methods for
Bacillus anthracis in view of its importance have
been described. A variety of methods are in
practice for detection of anthrax bacteria/spores
like polymerase chain reaction (PCR)13, enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA)14, and
immunofluorescence assay 15. As low as 1-1000
spores have been detected by these methods
which is the acceptable limit of detection16.
However, the detect ion of spores f rom
environmental samples is difficult and fluorescence
microscopy coupled with pre-concentration has
been proved as a fast, easy, and specific method15.
A few advance portable devices like rapid analyte
measurement platform (RAMP) 17 and biohazard
detection system (BDS)18 have also been developed
for detection of Bacillus anthracis spores from
environmental samples.
Live-attenuated and protein-based vaccines are
in use for human beings by different countries but
these vaccines also have side effects and protect
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the individual only for a short duration. Common
antibiotics like tetracycline are largely effective
during the early course of infection but treatment
becomes largely ineffective if onset of symptoms
have occurred.
2.1.2 Yersinia pestis
It is Gram-negative, non-motile, rod shaped,
facultative anaerobe that shows bipolar (also called
safety pin) staining with Geimsa stain (Fig. 1(b)).
Yersinia pestis is the agent of plague, a zoonotic
disease of rodents and other animals that is usually
transmitted to humans via flea bites. This route of
infection results in bubonic form of plague characterised
by the inflammation of lymph nodes in groin and
armpits referred to as bubos. Pneumonic plague
occurs as a result of hematogenous spread of plague
bacilli from bubos to lungs or after inhalation of the
organisms, the most likely route of infection as a
result of bioterrorist attack. The pneumonic form
of the plague is highly contagious and can spread
from person to person via airborne droplets.
Administration of streptomycin, gentamycin or
tetracycline early in the course of the disease is
an effective treatment19. The mortality rate for
untreated cases is more than 50 per cent.
2.1.3 Burkholderia mallei
Burkholderia mallei is a Gram-negative rod
shaped bacterium [Fig. 1(c)] which is the causative
Figure 1. Morphological features of some important biological warfare agents: (a) Bacillus anthracis, (b) Yersinia pestis (c)
Burkholderia mallei, (d) Brucella abortus (e) Clostridium botulinum, and (f) Staphylococcus aureus.
(c)
(a)
(e) (f)
(b)
(d)
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agent of glanders, a febrile illness that attacks
equine population. Human beings are their accidental
hosts and the disease has been reported among
individuals handling the infected animals. Because
of low infective dose, lack of effective vaccine
and therapy, Burkholderia mallei is considered as
a potential biological warfare agent. Glanders occurs
in four forms: (i) an acute localised form, (ii) a
septicemic and fatal form, (iii) an acute pulmonary
form, and (iv) a chronic form.
Aerosol infection can cause any of these four
forms. Incubation period of glanders ranges from
10-14 days post-exposure, and symptoms include
fever, sweat, myalgia, headache, chest pain, swelling
in lymph nodes, pustular eruptions, etc. The mortality
rate for septicemic form is 100 per cent, if untreated
but person to person transmission is rare20.
2.1.4 Brucella Species
Brucella are slow growing Gram-negative
coccobacilli which can survive in the environment
for several weeks [Fig. 1(d)]. Brucellosis, caused
by Brucella species is a zoonotic disease contracted
by humans as a result of contact with animals
infected with Brucella 21. There are four species
of Brucella pathogenic to human beings and the
disease-causing species in the decreasing order of
severity are Burkholderia melitensis (infect goats),
Burkholderia suis (infects swine), Burkholderia
abortus (infect cattle) and Burkholderia canis
(infects dogs). Infection in human beings by these
species can be established via cutaneous, respiratory
or gastrointestinal routes. Like most other biological
warfare agents, these are also extremely infectious
via aerosol route and as low as 10-100 organisms
are sufficient to cause the disease. The incubation
period of brucellosis is extremely variable, ranging
from 5-60 days and symptoms include fever, chills,
headache, sweating, depression, etc. The mortality
rate is only 5 per cent, if untreated and hence, it
is considered as an incapacitating type of disease.
2.1.5 Francicella tularensis
These are Gram-negative coccobacilli which
cause the disease called tularensis. This is primarily
a zoonotic disease and in human beings, it is caused
by animals, or from the bites of infected insects.
Though the organisms are susceptible to heat but
may persist for long duration in the environment
and in the animal products. Under natural conditions,
infection by inhalation or ingestion is less common
in human beings but exposure by aerosol (biological
warfare attack) would cause pneumonic tularemia.
As few as 10-50 organisms can cause the disease
in human beings which makes Francicella tularensis
an attractive biological warfare agent. Its incubation
period ranges from 2-10 days. Symptoms of pneumonic
tularamia caused by inhalation include fever, headache,
fatigue, weight loss, non-productive cough, and
pneumonia. Tularemia can be cured with antibiotics,
but if untreated, the mortality rate5 may be 35 per
cent to 60 per cent.
2.2 Viral Agents
2.2.1 Smallpox (Variola) Virus
The smallpox virus is the largest of all animal
viruses. Virus particles are brick to ovoid shaped.
Human beings are the only natural host of smallpox
virus, and infection is spread from person to person.
After about 12 days' incubation period, it causes
fever and headache. As the virus spreads to the
skin, it forms pus-filled vesicles throughout the
body. The mortality rate for immunised individuals
is approximately 3 per cent, while for non-immunised,
it increases to 30 per cent. Aerosol exposure to
individual may cause malaise, fevers, rigours, vomiting,
headache, and backache. The smallpox virus is
considered a much higher threat for the following
reasons 5:
• A larger population of the world is unimmunised
as the process of vaccination against smallpox
was stopped in 1980.
• High infectivity through aerosol
• The relative ease of culturing the virus.
After the declaration of World Health Organization
in 1980 that smallpox has been eradicated from the
earth, the vaccination for general public has been
stopped. As a result, the whole unimmunised human
population has become susceptible to the infection
of Variola virus, if encountered through bioterrorism
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or by any other mean. There is no effective treatment
for smallpox virus and the vaccine is not available
in the world except in the USA.
2.2.2 Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE)
Virus
It is an arthropod-borne virus and the disease
is caused by mosquito bite. Animals like horses,
mules, and donkeys serve as natural reservoir of
this virus. Besides, this virus is highly infectious
via aerosol. The incubation time ranges from 2-6
days and symptoms include malaise, spiking fever,
headache, light sensitivity, etc. Some patients may
consequently develop neurological complications
at the later phase of the disease20. It is largely
considered as an incapacitating agent and the mortality
rate is very low (1%).
2.2.3 Ebolla and Marburg Viruses
These are the two major viruses among others
which cause viral haemorrhagic fever. Person to
person transmission of these viruses occurs through
direct contact with infected bodily fluids and organs.
The high mortality rate (30-90 %), low infective
dose, and lack of treatment make these viruses
desirable for use as biological warfare agents. The
incubation period for viral haemorrhagic fever ranges
from 4–21 days. Symptoms are fever, muscular
pain, headache, vomiting, and diarrhoea5.
2.3 Fungal Agents
Coccidioides immitis is a dimorphic spore-
forming fungal pathogen that causes a disease
called coccidioidomycosis. Most often, the disease
causes mild flu-like symptoms. The disease often
begins as a benign, inapparent or mild upper respiratory
infection that usually resolves rapidly, but if infection
is stabilised, the disease may progress as a chronic
pulmonary condition or as a systemic disease involving
the meninges (lining the brain), bones, joints, and
subcutaneous and cutaneous tissues22. In untreated
cases, the mortality rate is as high as 50 per cent.
The disease can be cured with amphotericin B,
ketoconazole or itraconazole.While most fungi do
not generally cause fatal disease in healthy human
beings, they can be used to destroy crops23-25.
2.4 Toxins
There are mainly three microbial toxins apart
from ricin (phytotoxin) which have potential for
use as biological warfare agents:
2.4.1 Botulinum Toxins
These are the causative agents of a diseased
condition called botulism, and are produced by the
bacteria, Clostridium botulinum (Fig. 1(e)). These
toxins are released upon the death and lysis of the
organism. Botulinum toxins are the most poisonous
substances ever known. As little as five picogram
(5 x 10–12 kg) of botulinum toxin is enough to kill
a laboratory mouse. According to an estimate, 39.2 g
of botulinum toxin is sufficient to kill the whole
human world population of six billion. The toxin is
100 million-times more toxic than cobra venom
and 1,00,000-times more toxic than the most dreaded
chemical warfare nerve agent, sarin7,20. Botulinum
toxin blocks the release of the neurotransmitter,
acetylcholine, and thereby prevents transmission
of nerves impulses. Classically, botulism in human
beings occurs as food poisoning which does not
involve fever, although it causes difficulty in breathing
and problems with vision (the pupils may become
fixed). Death is caused by respiratory arrest within
24 h of ingesting the toxin. With effective supportive
therapy, the mortality rate from botulism can be
reduced to 10 per cent.
Surprisingly, very little work has been done on
this toxin by Indian scientific institutions and bacterial
cultures/isolates are not available anywhere in India.
However, Defence Research and Development
Establishment (DRDE), Gwalior, has succeeded in
isolating Clostridium botulinum from Gwalior region
which produce different types of botulinum toxins.
2.4.2 Staphylococal Enterotoxin (Type B)
Most people encounter the bacterium,
Staphylococus aureus [Fig. 1(f)] and its enterotoxin,
Staphylococal enterotoxin (type B) (SEB), at some
point in their lives from food poisoning. As a potential
biological weapon, aerosolised SEB could cause
80 per cent or more of targeted personnel to become
extremely ill within 3-12 h. The toxin can withstand
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boiling temperature and is resistant to acids and
alkalies to a great extent. These properties are of
concern in terms of a possible attack using SEB
in water and food supplies. It might take up to 1-
2 weeks for human beings to recover from SEB
poisoning, and higher concentrations of SEB could
even cause septic shock and death5.
2.4.3 Trichothecene Mycotoxins
Trichothecene mycotoxins (T2 toxin) are
produced by a number of fungi like Fusarium ,
Trichoderma , Myrothecium , Stachybotrys , etc.
These cause a diseased condition called alimentary
toxic aleukia (ATA). Typical ATA symptoms
include vomiting, severe skin irritation, and internal
bleeding 20. T2 toxin is unique among biological
warfare agents in that it is a skin-damaging agent
of great potency– several hundred-times more
potent than the chemical warfare agents, mustard
or lewisite9,26. It is able to injure the eye in microgram
quantities, which again indicates that it is more
potent than mustard gas.
2.5 Ricin Toxin
Castor plant Ricinus communis is the producer
of ricin toxin and is grown world over. Seeds of
the plant are the source of the toxin. Ricin, consisting
of two peptide chains (A and B), is quite stable in
the environment and is toxic when ingested, injected
or even inhaled. Widespread availability and production
ease are the main reasons for the toxin to be used
as biological warfare agent. Symptoms of ricin
toxicity appear within 18-24 h after exposure
which include fever, cough, breathlessness, nausea,
joint pain, etc. Ricin is suspected to cause
respiratory failure when inhaled20. It also causes
severe gastrointestinal symptoms followed by
vascular collapse and damage, if ingested, and
multiple organ failure, when injected. Presently,
no vaccine is available as preventive therapy
for ricin toxin.
3 BIODEFENCE
Biodefence is the defence against biological
warfare agents including toxins. It has two integral
components–detection and protection.
3.1 Detection
Most of the biological warfare agents are contagious
except toxins and a few pathogens, so they will
readily spread to targeted/ non-targeted human population
causing panic in general public in case of a biological
warfare attack. Therefore, their prompt detection
is of utmost importance, and microbiological laboratories
with their state-of-the-art detection and identification
tools will be at the helm of affairs. Detection can
be of general nature involving laser sensors for
remote surveillance of the environment, indicating
the increase in concentration of microorganisms in
a particular locality. This should be a routine exercise
and will work as an early warning for a possible
biological warfare agent attack27
. In the event of
a bioterrorist attack, one needs to specifically identify
the organism to the species level, and that too
within a short period of time, so that countermeasures
can be applied. Therefore, any detection system
should have properties of rapidity, sensitivity, and
specificity.
Detection and identification methods can be
classified as conventional microbiological methods
and rapid, specific and sensitive methods.
3.1.1 Conventional Microbiological Methods
These include culture and growth of microorganisms
and their subsequent identification by biochemical
and serological tests10,28-31. But these are too slow for
early countermeasures; however, these can be used for
final confirmation of the biological warfare agent.
3.1.2 Rapid, Specific, and Sensitive Methods
These methods include polymerase chain reaction
(PCR), DNA probes, immunosensors, flow cytometry,
and gas chromatography coupled with mass spectrometry
(GC-MS)32, 33. These are the basic tools being employed
in the development of more sensitive and robust
detection systems like bio detector (BD), rapid
analyte measurement platform (RAMP), microbial
identification system (MIS), and biohazard detection
system (BDS)16-18,34. These are state-of-the-art online
detection systems composed of air samplers and
biosensors that can pinpoint the presence of specific
organism in the aerosol. Most of these systems are
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capable of detecting two or more biological warfare
agents simultaneously.
Bio detector, developed jointly by M/s Smith
Detection and United States Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), is
an automatic device capable of operating34 continually
for 14 h. When a threat is detected, it generates
audio-visual alarm and specifies the type of organism
and its concentration. The system is immuno-based
and uses light addressable potentiometric sensor.
BD is capable of detecting eight different biological
warfare agents simultaneously within 15 min.
Rapid analyte measurement platform is a platform
technology which consists of two components, a
disposable test cartridge that houses an analyte
specific immunochromatographic strip, and a portable
fluorescence reader that quantifies antigen-antibody
complexes17. The system is able to perform
environmental tests for detection of a number of
biological warfare agents including B. anthracis,
botulinum, and ricin toxins. Some of the test systems
available in India for detection of important biological
warfare agents are listed in Table 3.
Defence Research and  Development
Establishment (DRDE), Gwalior, is also working
for the   development of diagnostics for different
bacterial, viral, and toxin agents. A fast method for
the    detection of anthrax spores from environmental
samples has been developed. This involves concentration/
enrichment of spores, followed by detection using
immunofluorescence microscopy. The method is
very specific and the test is completed within two
hours15.
Further, toxigenic strains of Bacillus anthracis
have been detected by nested polymerase chain
reaction (PCR)13. A rapid agglutination-based test
for ricin10 with a sensitivity of 9 µg/ml, and an
enzyme-based assay for cyanobacterial toxins have
also been established. A duplex PCR for differentiation
of toxigenic and non-toxigenic Vibrio cholerae is
a routine practice35. Use of immunomagnetic beads
for the enrichment of environmental and clinical
samples followed by duplex PCR is very effective
during the cholera outbreaks.
In addition to the laboratory-based methods
for the detection of biological warfare agents, DRDE,
Gwalior, has also developed various field-based
detection kits for different pathogens, eg, plague,
anthrax, dengue, typhoid, brucella, malaria, leptospira,
etc. Besides, kits for detection of different bacterial
and phytotoxins are at different stages of development.
3.2 Protection
Protection is to adopt various control measures
to prevent the disease after exposure to harmful
concentrations of biological warfare agent. These
include physical protection, decontamination, and
medical management. Physical protection equipments
include protective gowns, boots, gloves, and face
masks fitted with HEPA filters to prevent entry of
live biological warfare agent into the human body.
These are personal protective equipment but collective
protection equipments are also important in the
event of biological warfare agent attack, and include
water purification plants, shelters fitted with HEPA
filters for supply of germ-free air36,37. The other
important area of protection is decontamination of
personnel, equipments, and surrounding environment.
Personal decontamination is carried out by taking
a bath with soap and water38,39. Vehicles, clothing,
Detection test type Disease/ BW 
agent Indigenous Imported 
Anthrax ELISA, 
immunofluorescence 
microscopy 
ELISA 
Plague ELISA, agglutination ELISA 
Brucellosis ELISA ELISA 
Hanta virus No ELISA 
Q-fever No ELISA 
Ricin toxin  Agglutination No 
T2 toxin No No 
Botulinum toxin ELISA No 
SEB ELISA ELISA, 
agglutination 
Small pox  No No 
Ebola virus No No 
Marburg virus No No 
 
Table 3. Detection tests for BW agents available in India
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and equipment can be decontaminated using chemical
reagents like detergents (for clothing), and formalin,
glutaraldehyde, alcohol, and hypochlorite (for equipment
and biological samples). The contaminated terrains
can best be decontaminated using formalin solution
(0.5 %) in the form of foam or froth.
Among the medical management practices, the
most important aspect is the use of antibiotics and
drugs to save the life of patients30,40. The common
antibiotics used for different biological warfare
agents are listed in Table 2. However, in cases
where no antibiotic treatment is available, post-
exposure prophylactic treatment is given, eg, in
case of botulinum toxin, antitoxin is used for curing
the patient alongwith life supportive devices like
artificial respiration.
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